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II.—THE NATURE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE.
BY 8. H. MELLONE.
" I T is evident," observes Mr. F. H. Bradley, "that both
practical and theoretical knowledge of the human mind is
possessed by thoqe who are not metaphysicians." It is also
possessed by those who are not psychologists, inasmuch as
they know nothing of psychology as a science. The General
Nature of Self-knowledge is the problem of this paper.
§ 1. This inquiry is not the same as an attempt to explain
knowledge by something else. The self-contradictory char-
acter of such a task would be generally recognised at present.
But self-knowledge is a relation involved in the essential
nature of Intelligence, and hence its place in the organic
structure of Intelligence can be analysed without self-con-
tradiction. To insist merely that such a relation is " unique "
and " unanalysable " would be futile. A sound maxim has
beeu laid down by one of our modern writers: Whenever
we find a " mystery " we are making an assumption ; and it
is our duty to probe the assumption to the bottom, before
we fall down to worship the mystery.
No philosophical issue is of more fundamental importance
than the problem of self-knowledge. It pertains to the root
of every discussion as to the means by which the psychologist
arrives at the facts which he is to explain. And again, it
underlies such discussions as arise out of Mr. Bradley's and
Prof. Miinsterberg's recent contributions to the problem of
the relation between truth in psychology and truth in reality.1
Yet, fundamental as these issues are, to discuss the question
of self-knowledge as though it had no existence outside their
limits would be a serious mistake; and there is reason to
fear that its importance is frequently missed because its
different forms have not been brought together. Thus we
find self-consciousness treated as a process of the " natural
F. H. Bradle\, "Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology," MIND,
No. 33; H. Munsterberg, " Psychology and Life " (<•/. R. B. Hftldane in
• MIND, NO. 3i).
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THE NATURE OP SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 319
history of the individual mind," which is nothing more than
a problem for psychology; while among the inevitable pro-
legomena to psychology, there is a perpetual lawsuit as to the
method and limits of psychological knowledge, which is only
another form of self-consciousness. Again, the Kantian
" transcendental logic " is said to be a " complete analysis
of self-consciousness, and the systematic evolution of all
that is contained in the very notion of self-consciousness,"
while finally in some forms of philosophical theory we find
self-consciousuess treated as " consciousness of the Unity of
the Universe ". And none of these meanings of the term
will cover the widely diffused knowledge of mind which has
originated independently of psychology and philosophy as
special studies.
The term " self-knowledge " is used in the present paper so
as to include all that professes to be knowledge of some form
of our inner life and has been founded on direct analysis
thereof,—however concrete or abstract may be the terms in
which it is expressed,—whether it- is some one's statement
of a personal characteristic of his own, or an intelligent
" knowledge of human nature," or a psychological, logical,
or philosophical generalisation. Self-knowledge is a funda-
mental function of our intelligence; and one and the same
principle runs through and determines all its forms and
degrees.
It will be useful to diotinguish first a theory of self-know-
ledge which perhaps has not often been consciously held, but
which is implied in many views and theories of the subject
which have Deen widely supported.
The traditional account of knowledge recognises that it is
always a relation or reference, involving a duality or distinc-
tion between the respective loci of the knowing and the
known. That this is sound in principle is not to be denied ;
but a favourite way of describing the distinction is calculated
to lead only to confusion. Knowledge, it is said, necessarily
involves a duality of terms in the form of Subject knowing
and Object known. Then in the case of self-knowledge
there creeps in the assumption that knowledge is analogous
to a light proceeding from the Subject and shed on the
Object; the Subject is like an eye that is itself the source
of the light by which it sees, and the knowing is like the
seeing. This I will call the " eye-theory " of self-knowledge;
and it may be worked out in different ways.
(a) It combines readily with another favourite doctrine:
that we must make a sharp distinction between the " pure '*
and the "empirical" self; or, in other words, between the
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mental phenomena, the changing temporal states, and the
mental noumenon, the permanent substance or substratum
" underlying " them. In the case of self-knowledge, the
noumenon is the Subject which knows, the phenomena are the
psychological objects known. Then the question arises, how
can the Subject, as such, know itself? The reader will
remember that Mr. H. Spencer, among many others, has
vigorously contended for the existence of such a Subject as a
necessary assumption. Combine with this the assumption
that "the fundamental condition of all knowledge is the
antithesis of Subject and Object," and we have the natural
conclusion that the Subject, though it may know its pheno-
mena to any extent, can never know itself : " The mental
act in which self is known implies, like every other mental
act, a perceiving Subject and an Object perceived. If then
tHe Object perceived is Self, what is the Subject that per-
ceives ? Or if it be the true self which thinks, what other
self can be thought of ? Clearly the true cognisance of self
implies a state in which the knowing and the known are
one, in whioh Subject and Object are identified ; and this
is the annihilation of both. So that the personality of
which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to
each a fact beyond all others most certain, is yet a thing
which cannot be known at all: knowledge of it is forbidden
by the very nature of thought."
Two ways of avoiding this difficulty have been occasionally
suggested. One is, to assume that Subject and Object are
really identical in self-knowledge. This I suppose is the
ordinary expression of the intuitional view, that the soul"
simply knows itself to exist. But what meaning can " the
identity of subject and object " have in this connexion ?
Apparently its only meaning can be to obliterate the rela-
tion or reference which is essential in all knowledge. So
far, Spencer's rejection of it is justified. The other resource
is to affirm that the Subject is known by inference. If so,
it must be a postulate to account for changes in the field of
psychological objects. But if our knowledge of it is only
inferential or mediate, we could never know what to assume
in order to account for these subjectively-initiated changes.
How could we even conceive or think about self or any of
its activities without some basis of immediate experience to
account for the conception ? Mr. Spencer saw this, and
expressed it in a well-known passage which I will quote
because it sets forth a fundamental truth with regard to the
element of immediacy in all conscious experience: " In each
mental act there is an element which persists. But the
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persistence of this element under successive conditions ne-
cessitates the sense of it as distinguished from the conditions
and independent of them. That which is common to all
states of consciousness and cannot be got nd of, is what we
predicate by the term existence. . . . There remains an in-
definite consciousness of something common under all modes
—of being apart from its appearances. . . . Our conscious-
ness of the unconditioned being literally tbe unconditioned
consciousness or raw material of thought, to which we in
thinking give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present
sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence.
As we can in successive mental acto get nd of all particular
conditions and replace them by others, but cannot get rid
of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is
conditioned anew in every thought, there ever remains a sense
of that which exists persistently and independently of con-
ditions, . . . an indefinite consciousness of an absolute reality
transcending relations."1 We have here a recognition of the
same truth which has been elaborated in Mr. Bradley's
doctrine of Peeling, and Mr. Stout's distinction of " noetic "
and "anoetic" consciousness. At present we note its par-
ticular implication, that we could never infer the- existence
of the Ego or any function of the Ego, such as Freedom,
Volition, or pure Feeling, if that which we infer were not
already present in consciousness but undiscriminated,—
present by way of experience, immediate but not yet defined.
Both these attempts to remove the difficulty referred to
by Spencer are, therefore, ineffective; but the difficulty is a
fictitious one, for, as we shall see, the distinction of Subject
and Object affords an altogether inadequate statement of the
problem of self-knowledge. The perplexities that ensue are
of our own making, and ought to be taken as a reductio ad
absurdum of the " eye-theory ".
(b) The theory may of course be held apart from any
agnostic bias. It assumes that introspection is essentially
a certain direction of the attention, and may be compared
to a direct inspection of the contents of consciousness. The
latter are, therefore, the objects of psychological knowledge.*
This is the traditional view in Psychology. But it is so un-
necessary and so indefensible that it can scarcely be allowed
even the relative validity of a working assumption.
1
 With the doctrine that thought by " conditioning " an object renders
it " unknowable," we have of course nothing to do.
1
 When we assume that all of what introspection reveals must belong
to these contents, as elements in them or aspects of them, then we have
wh»t has been called the bias of " Presentataonism ".
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Its main defects may be expressed in various ways. It
assumes psychological knowledge to be absolutely different
in kind from all other knowledge. Without parallel in the .
world of knowledge is this process by which the contents of
mind unroll themselves before the "inner eye," as soon as
this mysterious organ turns its attention to them. More
pregnantly expressed, our charge is that the theory separates
the Knowing from the known so that the connexion becomes
a merely external one; the knowing becomes a formal process
with, no essential relation to what is known. And as it is
the merely individual and merely finite sides of the mind,
with the elements composing it, which are thus " observed,"
this theory prepares the way for mechanical and atomistic
theories in Psychology, logic, and ethics. Everything
which, on this merely external view which is miscalled
elf-observation, appears to exist independently, is forth-
with treated as a positive self-contained existence. The
initial principle is the same whether the outcome be
sensationalism or intuitionalism,—whether the isolated
elements disclosed by " turning the mental «ye inwards "
are the particular " sensations ' out of which the mind is
supposed to be built up, or the particular " immediate
perceptions " which are supposed to lie at the basis of logic
and ethics.
(c)-But the most fatal defect in this " eye-theory " remains
to be noticed. On inspecting the contents of the mind we
are supposed to see what is there and how it is arranged.
The implication is that the ultimate truth can be attained
by sufficiently careful observation, and that any act of self-
knowledge has - the highest kind of certainty and is valid
in its own right. And since, again, the self whose processes
are thns known with perfect accuracy is the individual self
as finite, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the
results to which this error leads. For it has a " counter-
implication " ; what we clearly and distinctly observe within
us, is simply true, without qualification, and what we do not
or cannot thus observe, is simply not trua It may be objected
that this is the view of Common Sense : and it is so, in part
But Common Sense is before all things practical; it holds
that a man may know his own mental life sufficiently for
practical purposes, and it adds the important qualification
that " self-deception " is extremely easy. This means simply
that a man's ideas of his own inner life (particularly his
desires, character and plans) may be partly illusory. From
another point of view it may be objected that no one ever
denied so obvious a fact But principles which are not
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denied in theory may be ignored in practical
investigation and discussion. For example, a theory may be
quite defensible if understood as a reasonable, yet provisional,
interpretation of certain complex psychological facts ; reason-
able, oecause it is the best interpretation that we can arrive at,
yet provisional, because it is evidently incomplete compared
with the facts as a whole, and lacks internal coherence But
we find that in many cases such a theory is attacked and
defended as though it claimed to be the ultimate truth.
The whole controversy regarding Liberty and Necessity
has, I believe, been of this kind.' Incidentally, also, the
foregoing considerations show why the old-fashioned " appeal
to consciousness " in this and other similar vexed questions
is so futile To say " let consciousness decide " is idle, when
in each case the whole complexity of the problem lies in the
interpretation of consciousness
§ 2. Let us now bring together the positive implications
of the preceding critical remarks.
Both in psychology and metaphysics we must reject the
notion of a " pure ' or " transcendeutal " self. And the
notion of an " empirical" self must go along with it, for
the one is only conceived in antithesis to the other. The
real self is that which is known and realised or lived in
and through the actual process of conscious life. It is
essentially manifested in this its content; its individual
existence consists in gradually organising itself in certain
explicit, definite forms. Hence if we use such terms as
Noumenon and Phenomena, Reality and Appearances, we must
say that the former is known through the latter and can
be known in no other way. Similarly, with regard to the
relation of Subject and Object; to say that for knowledge
there must always be a Subject of knowledge, means that
thought or knowledge exists only as the thought of a thinker,
—it is always an activity, " an activo-passive experience of
an individual subject " ; and to say that for knowledge there
must be an object of knowledge, means that knowledge is
always a reference beyond its actual place of appearance as
the conscious function of a unite personality. Is it not of
the essence of knowledge to be representative or symbolic
of something whose existence transcends it,—something
which IB in a sense " other " or " more " than the knowledge
itself ? And what is referred to or known cannot be identi-
• That is to say: all that we can ask for is this—what is the least
inappropriate and incoherent interpretation of the fact of Freedom ?
Upon the fact, as such, all but materialists are agreed.
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fied with the process of'reference, the knowledge itself. But
all knowledge is direct in this sense—that it refers directly
to the reality known, the object referred to; and not in-
directly through some substitute intervening between this
and the knower. When a man reflects on his own states,
and when he reflects on something in the objective world—
e.g., the motives of another man's conduct, or the nature of
a chemical combination—his attitude to the " object " is the
same ; the reference is equally direct, though the knowledge
is necessarily imperfect, and may in some of its details be
illusory.
On this general question of the validity of self-knowledge,
we may say with Prof. Adamson : " Nothing is gained, as
regards accuracy of observation, by the ' intra-subjective'
character of both the observed and the observation. . . . If
to know the processes of consciousness means to be able to
determine accurately their characteristics and differences, I
should be inclined to say that we can hardly claim such
knowledge. What we do possess is painfully and laboriously
attained, and wants every mark of ' immediate certainty ' or
' absolutely self-evidencing' character. . . . I can be, in and
through the process of knowing, no more certain of what is
in my consciousness—if we allow for the moment that any
definite meaning can be put into so metaphorical an ex-
pression—than of what is beyond my consciousness. That
knowing is a process of mind, and that the known is in the
one case likewise a fact of mind, lends no additional certainty
to the resulting cognition."' And as in all knowledge, so in
observation of the inner life ; " the thoughts whereby we
determine the nature of the observed are neither in fact nor
in meaning identical with the observed ".2 This is evident
because in observing some fact of our inner life we do not
isolate it; the reflexion consists in relating it in manifold
ways, according to the interest of the moment; the most
fundamental being its relation to the idea of self—it is at
least a mode of my mental life. And to identify all these
relations with the thought of them as I observe the fact in
question, would be absurd. Self-knowledge, therefore, also
involves a reference.' But though this reference is direct, it
is indefinite and incomplete.
This is the primary implication of the view which is here
defended. No conception which we can form of the con-
stitution of the mind or of any factor therein can be an
1
 MIND, VOL xii., p. 126.
'On this point cf. also Stoat, Analytic Ptychology, I, 44.
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adequate representation of the reality; we cannot adequately
state in intellectual terms the nature of our inner experi-
ences. This does not mean merely that we do not know
all that we are; it is true of every piece of 6elf-conscious
reflexion in common life, and of psychological analysis both
general and detailed. All the results so obtained are relative
to the present state of our knowledge; they are necessarily
held subject to a revision which may have to be so thorough
as completely to transform them, and each in itself has
many missing links of connexion, and exhibits a general
want of satisfactory coherence. But such conceptions are
not therefore false; we must accept them if they are the
best account which we can now form of the realities to
which they refer. The more complete truth does not destroy
the less complete, but expands and transforms it. Truth is
like a picture of boundless extent and infinite detail, which
is obliterated for us and needs to be renewed, and of which
we have only recovered different disconnected portions, and
these only in vaguest outline. These portions can only be
correctly estimated when they are treated as such ; they are
fragments of the whole and not illusions; but they are
fragments of the whole, and not self-contained pieces of truth,
each of which can stand on its own merits. These con-
clusions as to self-knowledge seem to follow necessarily
from the very conception of truth as an organic whole; but
they need to be applied to the detailed theories of psychology.
One of the chief causes of the difficulty in arriving at
satisfactory inductions in psychology is, of course, that
the facts are immediately accessible to one observer only ;
and in order to serve more than a private purpose, in order
to have any scientific value, it is indispensable to raise the
result of self-knowledge from an individual to a general fact.
But the difficulty must not be put in the wrong place. As
we are no longer ruled by Mill's Logic, I suppose it will not
be denied that in Induction a single case, examined toith
sufficient care, can establish a universal law. The ideal of
this principle of induction is seen in Geometrical reasoning.
For example, to prove that " the three interior angles of any
triangle are together equal to two right angles," I must
have a " figure " before me, actually or in imagination : that
is, I must have recourse to the perception of a particular
case. This case may be that of an isosceles right-angled
triangle with sides and angles of fixed magnitude. But
when the conclusion is established by consideration of this
case alone, I may be sure that it holds of every other triangle,
because in the proof I have considered only the essentials
22
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326 8. H. MELLONB : •
of the case, and have not referred to the above-mentioned
particulars, nor to anything but what is stated in the de-
finition of a triangle. In Geometry we may be certain that
our investigation is sufficiently thorough—in other words,
that it is based only on the essentials of the particular case
with which we work—because we frame our own definition
of what these essentials are. But in physical or psychological
investigations, we have to discover the essentials; hence the
inductive conclusion suggested by any one instance has to
be carefully verified, or tested, and perhaps corrected, by
many other instances. Still, it is only the difficulties or
defects of our own investigation which prevent any one case
from establishing a reliable universal; while it is a constant
occurrence that one case may suggest the universal. Hence,
although "every mental state is by hypothesis observable,
introspectively, by one observer only," * it may perfectly wejl
suggest a universal law of mind. That introspection, by
itself, will do more than suggest a possible law, is very un-
likely, for as we have seen it is beset with innumerable
possibilities of error. Hence the scientific psychologist has
to verify the results of his introspective observations by
" appeals to language, to pathology, to childhood, to man-
kind in general". These objective expressions of mental
life, to which he refers, would have no meaning for him,
were it not for his previous introspective inductions, which
give him the only key of interpretation. He is interested in
such social facts as manifestations of mental states like to
those upon which he has been reflecting; as such alone, not
as "psycho-physical complexes,"* he appeals to them. He
is no more concerned with the fact that they are mediated
to bis reflexion by means of physiological processes, than
the student of a book is concerned with the operations of
writing, printing, etc., which have made him aware of the
author s thought.* On the other hand, as we observed, the
fact that the comparison and verification of the results of
self-knowledge are thus indirect, adds to the difficulty of
arriving at satisfactory inductions.
What, it may be asked, is the practical consequence of
this conclusion ? Is it simply to throw doubt upon all
varieties of self-knowledge, Dy viewing them as infected
with error to some undefined extent ? This would indeed be
futile. For practical life, its consequences are numerous and
1
 See Prof. Boyoe's observations in MIND, NO. 28, pp. 388-90.
'On the other side Bee Boyce, ibid., p. 891.
' Certain special exceptions which might be mentioned do not disprove
this role.
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important; because the number of beliefs which are held,
or denied, on the ground of appeals to " inner experiences "
and " feelings," is not small. For psychology and philo-
sophy, its chief consequence is thiB. Conclusions which will
work if taken as containing truth in solution, as it were—or,
as we may otherwise express it, which are symbolically true
—become unworkable and even self-contradictory if taken
as absolutely true. Criticism of «ny theory may be perfectly
valid in the latter view of its truth, and yet be worthless
in the former view of it, because an entirely wrong standard
is employed. In psychology the standard of perfect coher-
ence and clearness is an impossible one, and all criticism
which implies it is a mere irrelevancy. If we insist upon
attaining it, we do so at the cost of overlooking the com-
plexity of mental life, and perhaps of doing violence to some
of its essential features.
§ 3. That self-consciousness is a mode of knowledge
which, like all knowledge, must have degrees of truth—is a
brief and familiar way of stating the conclusion at which
we have arrived. But its significance cannot be properly
estimated apart from a closely related conception, with which
indeed the former stands or falls. I mean the fundamental
distinction and correlation (in all intelligible experience) of
Thought with the element of Immediacy, which Mr. Brad-
ley has called Feeling (after Hegel's Oe/Uhl), and which Mr.
Stout has called " anoetic consciousness ". We must note
carefully the implications of this conception in order to
connect it with the question of self-knowledge, (a) The
whole process of growth in our knowledge of the world
points back to a sensuous aveipov, which is the basis of
external perception; knowledge begins with the definite
articulation of this into intelligible fact. Sentience, so
understood, is not a chaos of data received from a foreign
agency ; and it is not an absolutely homogeneous state of
feeling; it contains variations which succeed one another
in a regular order—" felt differences " which are not a chaos.
Hence, as thought develops, it becomes possible for intellec-
tual distinctions to supervene upon these felt differences;
and not until this begins can Knowledge and intelligent
experience begin, (b) li we try to conceive a purely anoetic
consciousness, as such, we can only think of it as a limit
which may be gradually approached. In this limit there
would still be "diverse aspects," though "not yet broken
up into terms and relations " ; some of these would be
" features of what later becomes the environment," and
would be indivisibly one with " the features of what later
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Jbecomes the self", (c) Self-knowledge involves the same
element of immediate experience, which, as suchV is not the
knowledge in question, but on the basis of which alone
is the knowledge possible. This distinction of anoetic and
noetic consciousness has great significance at every stage
of mental growth, though doubtless it is first suggested by
the contrast of the earliest with the later stages. It means
that not only in the beginning, but at every stage, there
are whole regions of mental life which, though they may
be truly said to be present in consciousness, are not present
to consciousness in the sense of being knmon, i.e., intellec-
tually discriminated and interpreted; but they may largely
determine the character and contents of those regions of
mental life which are known. Our self-knowledge grows
in depth and truth whenever something more of what is
present in consciousness becomes not only present in, but
present to, consciousness. This, then, is the fundamental
principle running through all forms of self-knowledge. We
express it in very simple language. Before any fact can be
known to any extent, or thought about, in the proper sense
of the word, it must be felt; in the one case the feeling is
there, but is not thought about, or only vaguely thought
about; in the other case, the feeling is still there, but
thought has begun to grasp and construct its meaning.1
Our capacity for higher insight and knowledge grows as
we pass from the former state into the latter.
Thus self-consciousness may be the most superficial or the
most fundamental mode of knowledge, according to the degree
of truth which we understand it to have attained. It is the
result of the self-transcending tendency of thought through
which thought always refers beyond itself. If we have regard
only to that degree of truth which is necessary for the prac-
tical and theoretical purposes of everyday life and of physical
science, we may say that this " reference beyond " is in two
directions. By the " outer" direction of its intelligence the
conscious self conceives (or is capable of conceiving) of the
world as a whole with its dependent parts ; by the " inner "
direction of its intelligence it conceives of itself as an indivi-
dual centre, having the unity of a personal life which is more
than knowledge. Common Sense adopts a point of view
1
 From this principle it follows naturally that in the case of psycho-
logical analysis, we do not and can not analyse what is discriminated,
or what is present to consciousness ; bat our thought reconstructs what
ieas present but undistinguished in consciousness or in the results of
previous analysis or discrimination. Cf. Stout, Analytic Psychology,
vol. i., pp. 62-61.
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from which this distinction of the "inner" and "outer"
directions is regarded as practically ultimate. But analysis
need not go far to show that it is a metaphor with only a
limited applicability. Self-consciousness includes an aware-
ness of the processes in us by which our consciousness of a
world is realised and extended ; or rather, it is capable in its
higher degrees of including this awareness, but always includes
fragments of it. When thus developed self-consciousness
brings to light the fundamental presuppositions and ultimate
ideals of physical knowledge (e.g., the world as a systematic
unity—within which general laws obtain). Similarly, by
reflexion on the ethical and aesthetic consciousness (and its
actual achievements), ideals of Goodness and of Beauty are
brought to light. Whether we regard self-consciousness,
when fundamentally developed, as finite or not, depends on
considerations arising out of a general metaphysical position ;
but if we conclude that the human self has a finite and
infinite side, then self-conscious is merely finite only in so
far as we have not learnt to know the real constitution of our
nature. The principle is throughout the same ; there is
always the general background of sentience, out of which
arises thought itself and the experience which thought
makes intelligible, and in this intellectual formulation of
what was previously undistinguished, the process of know-
ledge consists.
§4. These conclusions may now be applied to certain
questions affecting the position of Psychology as a science.
1 will take these questions in the form in which they are
set forth in Mr. Bradley's suggestive and thorough-going
" Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology". I do not
write as a mere critic of what is said in that paper, for I
have been glad to find that, in what seem to be the most
essential points, the views which I have been trying to defend
are in harmony with those of Mr. Bradley. And it is clear
that by " Phenomenalism " Mr. Bradley means something
very different from what Prof. Seth, Prof. Ward and others
have attacked as " Presentationism ". The essence of this
theory or method, as I conceive it, is to reduce all the
contents of mind to complications of atomic sensations ; the
only function of the mind being sensation characterised
by quality, intensity, and tone of feeling. No one thinks
of denying that the subject may be thus treated when
approached from the point of view of Physiology and of
Psycho-physical Experiment ; but such a procedure gives
only a useful fragment of Psychology, and not the whole
of it. What we protest against is the assumption that the
2 2
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only " scientific " and non-metaphysical treatment must be
of this kind. And I cannot see how this assumption can
be dismissed as a " grosn error," as " exploded in principle,"
as " a thing with which one need hardly trouble oneself," *
when it is openly made and defended by some of the fore-
most psychologists of the day. Hence it seems to need
and to deserve more careful examination than Mr. Bradley
is willing to give it*
The points raised by Mr. Bradley, on which I should like
to remark, are these: the correlation of the known with
the experienced; the principle by which Psychology iB to
be separated from Metaphysics ; and the validity of the
" General Analysis of Mind ".*
(a) Remembering that experience includes anoetic con-
sciousness, which is present in every stage of mental life,
and present most of all in our consciousness of Ideals, we
must give an unqualified adhesion to the fundamental view
that if anything is eliminated from the experienced world
it is iii fact banished from the world altogether : for there
is no other world in which it could exist.4 Hence not
only Pleasure-pain, Will, and Self, but also Reason, our
highest rational Ideals, and the Absolute itself must be
experienced if they are known. Mr. Bradley refers (p. 38)
to a view that Self and its activities, including Pleasnre-pain,
" is not itself perceived, and does not itself enter into the
experienced content, and is not and cannot itself be made
into an object". If this means, strictly and literally, that
it canuot be experienced, then such a view is " a thing with
which one need hardly trouble oneself ". But the statement
that the Self " cannot be made into a psychological object,"
contains a subtle ambiguity, which requires mention, as such
statements are frequently met with.6 Psychology is not
bound, and as a particular science is not able, to discuss
the ultimate uature of the Self, the Will, etc.; but if it is to
1
 MIND, NO. 33, p. 37.
1
 Of. Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Cons/ruction, ch. i\.,
pp. 209-224. As Mr. Bradley has referred to this book, I uill say here
that in ch. v., which deals with the question of Self-knowledge, the
problem now seems to me to have been imperfectly stated and wrongly
approached.
' Philosophical Criticism, pp. 46, 68, 109.
4
 MIND, NO. 33, p. 4L
8
 Cf. for example some of the views referred to by Mr. Haldane : " An
absolutely final Subject . . . never itself capable of presentation as an
object within experience "; " an activity that lies beyond experience and
is detenninable only as .that which makes experience possible " ; " the
will as buch . . . can never itself be an object in experience,—is not
cognisable by psychological methods " (MIND, NO. 34, pp. 206, 208, 210).
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exist at all it most know something about them. And so far
as Psychology knows anything about such factors of mental
life, those aspects which it knows are " objects before the
mind ". If again we are able in metaphysics to revise and
extend the partial, limited knowledge of Psychology, all that
we do is to determine the object more truly. To be made
an object in experience means to be discriminated and known;
hence, with Mr. Bradley, we reject as unmeaning the doctrine
that anything is never itself capable of presentation as an
object within experience. On the other hand, that which
is known is never identical with the knowing ; hence, in this
secondary sense, we have to affirm the doctrine that nothing
is ever itself capable of being presented within experience as
an object identical with the knowledge of it. And closely
connected with this use of the term in question, is the view
to which we shall have to refer immediately (o),— that
Pleasure-pain and Conation are not merely elements or
aspects of Presentation. This is what is usually meant by
saying that they cannot be made into " objects ".
(b) I regret to have to refer to the unprofitable and over-
discussed question of the relation of Psychology to Meta-
physics. Happily, Mr. Bradley has stated it in a fresh and
pregnant form. He looks for a " clear principle " of division
between the two, and finds it in this—that Psychology is
confined to phenomena and the laws of phenomena ; and,
" since Psychology is not concerned with more than this, it
is at liberty to use fictions, and the question of truth is not
to be raised in it except so far as truth means whatever
serves best to explain the course " of mere phenomena : the
course of phenomena being strictly limited to their co-
existence and sequence. But, whether the fault lie in-
myself or not, I am unable to see how this provides the
clear principle which is desired. For in thiB view of the
limits of Psychology, the conception of phenomenon is of
fundamental importance; and, from the nature of the case,
it must be a fluid conception,—apart from the restriction that
" it is not for the purpose in hand taken as anything more
than an adjective happening to and qualifying a particular
soul" (p. 28), which, as Mr. Bradley says, is not by itself
sufficient to exclude metaphysical questions (p. 27). What
is a phenomenon ? It is immediately experienced (p. 28);
and " what is experienced is a whole with certain aspects
which can be distinguished, but as so distinguished are
abstractions" (p. 36); but "phenomena are not all per-
ceptions, they are not all objects given to a self, they do not
all come before the mind " (p. 37). In other words, they
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are aspects of the experienced, which includes feeling. And
feeling includes as much as can be discovered in it. Of
course the previously undistinguished aspects of feeling
become objects, but their extent must be left indefinite.
For feeling is not limited to the " ccenfflsthesia," which is
present while life lasts; it is implied in mental analy-
sis at every level,—as much in the analysis of thought
itself by thought as in any other. In fact, "phenomena"
in this sense are properly denned as fragments or partial
aspects considered apart from the whole reality to which
they belong: everything is. therefore a phenomenon which
falls short of the whole Truth and Reality, and this is most
clearly true of all our psychological knowledge But I can-
not see how this fundamental truth can be so used as to
give us a clear principle of division between Psychology and
Metaphysics. Mr. Bradley's principle would be clear if
phenomena were limited to objects, and then psychological
phenomenalism would have close affinity with the meta-
physical phenomenalism which he rejects. Phenomena
would become, in both cases, facts which might be known
to any extent without our knowing any more of the Eeality
of which they are phenomena. But is there the least affinity,
as Mr. Bradley implies that there is (p. 26), between meta-
physical phenomenalism, so understood, and the psychological
phenomenalism which he defends? There are two funda-
mentally different conceptions of phenomena involved. In
the latter case phenomena are partial aspects; and there
is the closest relationship between phenomenalism in
Psychology and in Metaphysics,—only that in the case of
Psychology we are deliberately content to work with facts
which are evidently fragments and with laws which are
partly false, and in the case of Metaphysics we desire that
our finite thought and will shall completely express the
nature of Truth and Reality so far as it can be grasped by
us as a whole. But as we know that the • finite falls in-
definitely far short of the Absolute, to that extent we are
phenoinenalists in Metaphysics.
Here I wish to suggest another question. Is there really
much profit in discussing the division of Psychology m general
from Metaphysics ? It may be approached from the point
of view of Physiology, Psycho-physical Experiment, Mental
Pathology, Ethnology, Direct .Analysis, and Genetic Ex-
J)lanation. We only need to raise the question of divisionrom Metaphysics in the case of the last two of these
branches; and the answer to it surely must depend as much
on our conception of metaphysics and metaphysical method,
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as it does on our conception of psychological method: but
the method appropriate to Metaphysics can hardly be settled
before we begin Psychology. And from the side of Psy-
chology it seems impossible to find any principle which shall
be theoretically satisfactory. In Metaphysics the explana-
tions must be as true as we can make them,—the problems
probed as deeply as possible. In Psychology, numerous
questions, such as those mentioned by Mr. Bradley (p. 27),
are deliberately excluded, not on any principle but by a
practically necessary compromise. We see that as a matter
of fact if Psychology raised such questions, it would commit
suicide and be dissipated in Metaphysics,—it simply could
not exist as a particular science. Experience shows which
are the questions that Psychology can try to answer con-
sistently with its own existence. For the rest it is in the
interest of clear thinking not to stretch the separation of
Psychology from Metaphysics, lest in the supposed non-
metaphysical treatment certain metaphysical assumptions
should be lurking unseen and so giving a subtle bias to
"scientific" results. And it will not be denied that some
problems proper to Analytic and even to Genetic Psychology
may have important metaphysical and logical bearings.
(c) A large body of psychologists think that it is "most
convenient and also scientifically most useful to begin with
a "general analysis of mind,"—a statement of the typical
form of the psychologically complete mental function. Now
it is a common experience that when a change takes place
in our perceived environment, we are pleased or pained by
the change, and we act accordingly. Hence it is affirmed
that in the typical form of consciousness, we find a Subject
(1) perceiving objects, (2) feeling the pleasure or pain which
they excite, and (3) striving to them or away from them
accordingly. The three-fold function thus consists in Intel-
lection, Pleasure-pain, and Activity or Conation. It is also
affirmed that Pleasure-pain and Conation are not simply
elements in the presentation, so as to be constituent parts
of it; they are not mere aspects of the presentation (as are
quality and intensity) ; they are distinct enough from it to
be thought as absent without the presentation disappearing
with them. Mr. Bradley has criticised this view on the
assumption that it regards Pleasure-pain and Conation as
incapable of being experienced and as somehow known in-
directly. If any one has ever held such an extravagant
paradox, Mr. Bradley's crushing refutation of it is well
deserved. What is maintained is that as a matter of ex-
perience consciousness means knowledge and more than
2 2 *
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knowledge; and in this " more," we can as a matter of
experience distinguish (a) a state of which the intensity
appears in general to be conditioned by the presentations,
and (b) one of which the intensity appears in general to
condition the presentations.1 Mr. Bradley contrasts this
view with the one on which we have been dwelling above,—
the implication of feeling, the anoetic element of immediacy,
in all conscious life (pp. 40, 41); but to me they are so far
from being inconsistent, that I could not maintain the former
without the latter. When we assume- that, in general, the
Subject in being conscious of presentations is in a relation
of activity and affection (pleasure or pain) to them, we are
expressing in intellectual terms certain felt differences which
pervade mental life. For this reason, and no other, I am
able to estimate the significance of the expression which is
adopted. Hence I cannot admit that either here or in the
book to which Mr. Bradley refers, I have left a false view
standing Bide by side with the true one, with which it is
"radically discrepant" (p. 41). I maintain that there are
no general grounds on which the relative validity of this
General Analysis can be denied,3 and that through a large
Eart of the subject it will work. On the other hand, itsnutations were fully recognised. It is ouly applicable where
presentations have at least begun to be discriminated into
distinct objects. We can prove to demonstration that it
breaks down if applied to the beginning of consciousness in
the order of time on the earth,1 and to the ultimate Ideal
of consciousness; * and as a matter of present fact, it will
not work with those pleasures and pains whose exciting
objects come nearest to being modes of anoetic consciousness.
It is certain a priori that such limitations will pertain to
any psychological theory, whether general or not. But this
is no reason for its rejection, unless we have another theory
to propose which is in itself logically more satisfactory,
•The term Subject is used to emphasise the individualised or cen-
tralised character of every consciousness, with its unity at every moment
and its continuity through successive moments. To this Mr. Bradley
finds no objection (p. 30). The Presentations are modes of noetic con-
sciousness,—perceptions, mental images, ideas, memories, opinions, know-
ledges, and so forth. The Conation is normally guided by the pleasure
or pain which these arouse, and they are its object. I find myself that
I certainly do not attend to the pleasure-pain but to its object; and this
is especially marked if in order to maintain a pleasure m consciousness,
I seek to maintain its object and there is difficulty in doing so.
'The general grounds on which it may be defended were fully set
forth in Philosophical Criticism, eh. iv.
'Ibid., ch. v., p. 276 tf. * Ibid., ch. vii, p. 874 ff.
'Ibid., pp. 202, 203, 239 ff.
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which has more explaining power over such cruets of psy-
chology as are the problems of Emotion, Belief, Desire,
Attention, Association, and above all, which goes farther
towards enabling as to regard all forms of mental life as
modes of one fundamental function or type.
I will add a note in conclusion on a point connected with
our general subject. If there is an ultimate relation in ex-
perience, we cannot say that it is the relation of Presentation,
which implies the stage of noetic consciousness. A fact is
not presented to me until I have begun to think about it.
But in beginning to think about it, I am entering the region
of uncertainty and indenniteness as well as of knowledge,—
for it is the nature of knowledge to be a process of gradual
differentiation in which one "fact" alwayB implies others
and no fact is self-contained. We cannot get back to any
presentation which is free of this process of thought, or which
is ultimate in the sense of being a solid rock on which we
can stand and start We must rather say that .the funda-
mental relation in experience is "iact thought about". In
speaking of " fact," we draw attention to the place of sen-
tience in the growth of knowledge; while the thought about
it implies on the one hand the background of sentience to
be reconstructed, aud-1 on the other an Infinite Organism
whose functions are the laws and ideals of the thinking.
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